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ANTITRUST-Malamud v. Sinclair Oil Corp.The Sixth Circuit Applies the Data Processing"Zone
of Interests" Test to Standing Under Section 4 of the
Clayton Act.
Malamud v. Sinclair Oil Corp.' constitutes a clean break with
tradition in the determination of antitrust standing. Discarding the
rationale of a long line of cases adhering to the prevalent direct
injury and target area formulations, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals opted instead for a "zone of interests" test paralleling that
articulated by the United States Supreme Court in a case involving
judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act.2 In utilizing the criteria set forth in Association of Data Processing Service
Organizations,Inc. v. Camp,' the Malamud court availed itself of
the wealth of theories speaking to the notion of standing as a general
concept of justiciability. Malamud marks the first application of
this broad standard to the perplexing area of antitrust standing
under section 4 of the Clayton Act.'
The case arose from relatively commonplace facts. In 1965, plaintiffs Jack and Anne Malamud, the officers of the corporate plaintiff,
Malco Petroleum, Inc., executed a distribution agreement by which
Sinclair Refining Company agreed to supply gasoline and other petroleum products to Malco for resale over a three-year period. Sinclair also orally agreed to provide financial assistance to three real
estate investment firms owned by the plaintiffs in order to assist
them in acquiring new service station properties. Although Malamud presented five possible sites to Sinclair for approval in the next
few months, Sinclair refused to give any financial support. Upon the
expiration of the contract, the plaintiffs entered into a new contract
with Texaco, Inc., and filed suit against Sinclair, alleging violations
of section 1 of the Sherman Act' and section 3 of the Clayton Act.7
The district court partially denied Sinclair's motion for summary
judgment which alleged that plaintiffs lacked standing, dismissing
1. Malamud v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 521 F.2d 1142 (6th Cir. 1975).
5 U.S.C. §§ 551 et seq. (1970).

*2.
3.

397 U.S. 150 (1970).

4. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970) which in relevant part provides:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything

forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor .

.

. and shall recover threefold

the damages by him sustained ....

5. Malamud v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 521 F.2d 1142, 1144 (6th Cir. 1975).
6. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
7. 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1970).
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only the individual plaintiffs and the distributing company.' Because mixed questions of law and fact regarding the directness of the
alleged injury to the three real estate investment firms remained,
the court deemed summary judgment an inappropriate remedy.,
In response to defendant's appeal, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals declared invalid both the "direct injury" and "target area"
tests devised by federal courts to limit suits brought under section
4 of the Clayton Act. The court found these tests "demand too much
from plaintiffs at the pleading stage," and confuse determination
of a party's standing with a "decision on the merits of his position."'" The proper criteria was expressed in the two-part test announced in Association of Data ProcessingService Organizations,
Inc. v. Camp:" an allegation of injury in fact by plaintiff, and a
showing that
the interest sought to be protected by the complainant is arguably
within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the
2
statute or constitutional guarantee in question.'
The Malamud court held that under this test, the plaintiffs had
standing for:
[tihe interest sought to be protected by the real estate firms is the
expansion of their business by the acquisition and development of
additional service station sites. .

.

. The antitrust laws were en-

acted to preserve competition and thereby to protect the individual plaintiff and the consuming public from the effects of any
combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade. .

.

. Under the

circumstances as alleged in the plaintiffs' complaint, this denial
of financing arguably comes within the zone of interests protected
by the Sherman and Clayton Acts. Regardless of what the proof
at trial may show, the investment companies have made sufficient
allegations to establish their standing to sue under the antitrust
laws. '3
8. Malamud v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 521 F.2d 1142, 1145 (6th Cir. 1975).
9. Id. at 1146. Accord, Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 473
(1962).
10. Id. at 1149. The court disputed the fact that Volasco Products Co. v. Lloyd A. Fry
Roofing Co., 308 F.2d 383 (6th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 907 (1963), was authority for
the position that the Sixth Circuit adhered to the direct injury test.
Simply put, the Court in that case was not concerned with Volunteer's standing
but with its showing of directness on the merits. It is patently clear from the opinion
that Volunteer had appealed from the dismissal of its claim following a directed
verdict at the conclusion of plaintiff's proof and not from dismissal because plaintiff
was an improper litigant, i.e. a litigant without standing. 308 F.2d at 393.
Malamud v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 521 F.2d 1142, 1150-51 (6th Cir. 1975).
11. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
12. Id. at 153.
13. Malamud v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 521 F.2d 1142, 1151-52 (6th Cir. 1975).
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This article examines the development of the law of standing,
considers the methods heretofore used by the lower federal courts
to screen section 4 plaintiffs, and attempts to reconcile the Sixth
Circuit's use of a zone of interests test to determine the standing of
a private antitrust litigant.
STANDING AND JUSTICIABILITY

Generalizations about standing to sue are largely worthless as
such.14

The amorphous concept of standing embraces both the constitutional notion of justiciability and the prudential limitations created
by the Supreme Court to limit the exercise of federal jurisdiction. 5
The constitutional requirement of a "case or controversy ' 1 was
described by Chief Justice Hughes:
A "controversy" in this sense must be one that is appropriate for
judicial determination. A justiciable controversy is thus distinguished from a difference or dispute of a hypothetical or abstract
character; from one that is academic or moot. The controversy
must be definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of
parties having adverse legal interests. It must be a real and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree of
a conclusive character, as distinguished from an opinion advising
17
what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.
Once the existence of a viable case or controversy has been established, the exercise of judicial discretion serves to determine
whether the particular plaintiff is justified in seeking "exercise of
the court's remedial powers on his behalf;"'" whether he has "alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
issues

....

"I'

14. Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 151 (1970).
15. Warth v. Seldin, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 2205 (1975). The scope of federal jurisdiction is governed by the presence or absence of the following factors: (1) the existence of a "case or
controversy" as required by article III of the United States Constitution; (2) sovereign immunity; (3) lack of standing; (4) political question; (5) exhaustion of administrative remedies
and primary jurisdiction; and (6) prematurity or ripeness. Proceedings of the 34th Annual
Judicial Conference of the District of Columbia Circuit, 61 F.R.D. 147, 170 (1973).
16. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
17. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240-41 (1937). However, this definition
abounds with language which lends itself to varying and inconsistent interpretations and
therefore has signified different things to different courts. In Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94
(1968), the Court noted that the words case and controversy:
have an iceberg quality, containing beneath their surface simplicity submerged
complexities which go to the very heart of our constitutional form of government.
18. Warth v. Seldin, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 2205 (1975).
19. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
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The determination of whether a litigant has standing to sue has
been described as "a practical separation of the meritorious sheep
.20 In application, whether the refrom the capricious goats ...
quirement of justiciability is met has usually been determined by
weighing the appropriateness of the issues for decision against the
hardship of denying judicial relief.'
Justiciability also includes the concept that the judiciary refuses
to violate the constitutional separation of powers doctrine by intruding into the domain of another governmental branch. As such, justiciability prohibits adjudication of political questions and rendering
advisory opinions.
In examining the various aspects of standing, it is important to
be cognizant of whether the particular right of action is statutory
or nonstatutory. Since statutory standing is generally based on an
express congressional grant, the court's determination of the justiciability of a particular claim focuses on the parameters of that legislation. However, when a right of action is not based on a statute
which confers standing on a designated class of persons, justiciability requires that the court focus instead on the particular plaintiff
and whether he is the proper party to bring the action.2"
Standing in private antitrust litigation is something of a hybrid;
as with statutory standing, there is an express grant of a right of
action for a legal wrong; as with nonstatutory standing, the grant is
general, unrelated to the specific violations charged. The Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 3 providing judicial review of agency
action resulting in legal wrong and remedies for persons aggrieved
by such agency action, similarly stands somewhere between statutory and nonstatutory standing.
Section 4 plaintiffs occupy a purgatory not unlike APA "persons
aggrieved." 2 4 The Malamud court chose to apply the Data
Processing test, which was developed to deal with judicial review
under the APA, to treble damage actions, and thereby bridged the
chasm between administrative and antitrust law.
This ambiguity inherent in the concept of standing in antitrust
20. Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859, 872 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
21. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 156 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
22. See generally Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court-A FunctionalAnalysis, 86 HARV.
L. REv. 645 (1973); see also Comment, Standing-Supreme Court Limits Taxpayer Standing-United States v. Richardson, 8 CREIGHTON L. REV. 523 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
Supreme Court Limits Taxpayer Standing].
23. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551 et seq. (1970).
24. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970).
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cases necessitates a brief survey of the Supreme Court decisions
which have shaped the doctrine of standing.
THE DECISIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW OF STANDING

The Supreme Court's ruling in Frothingham v. Mellon" that a
federal taxpayer is generally without standing to challenge the constitutionality of a federal statute stood for 45 years as a barrier to
suits by private parties in their capacities as taxpayers. The Court
held that a taxpayer's interest in treasury moneys was "shared with
millions of others" and was therefore so "minute and indeterminable" and so "remote, fluctuating and uncertain" that there was
insufficient interest upon which to base a claim.26 In order to have
standing, the plaintiff
must be able to show, not only that the statute is invalid but that
he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some
direct injury as the result of its enforcement, and not merely that
he suffers in some indefinite way in common with people gener27
ally.
In Flast v. Cohen,2 the Court dispelled the notion that taxpayerlitigants should be necessarily denied standing for lack of a substantial personal stake in the dispute.2 9 The Court set forth new criteria
for standing in taxpayer litigation:
First, the taxpayer must establish a logical link between that status and the type of legislative enactment attacked. Thus, a taxpayer will be a proper party to allege the unconstitutionality only
of exercises of congressional power under the taxing and spending
clause of Art. I, § 8, of the Constitution. . . . Secondly, the taxpayer must establish a nexus between that status and the precise
nature of the constitutional infringement alleged. 0
The taxpayer was therefore required to show a violation of a specific
constitutional limitation on the specific constitutional grant of the
25. 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
26. Id. at 487.
27. Id. at 488.
28. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
29. Id. at 101. For a time, it was thought that the limitations imposed in Frothingham
were constitutional in nature and that taxpayer suits were forever barred, since the Court had
concluded by stating that the substance of the claim asked the Court to prevent officials of
the government from executing an unconstitutional act of Congress, which it refused to do.
'To do so would be not to decide a judicial controversy, but to assume a position of
authority over the governmental acts of another and coequal department, an authority which plainly we do not possess. Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 48889 (1923).
30. Id. at 102.
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taxing and spending power.3 1 In Flast, since the plaintiffs had alleged that the challenged expenditure made under article I, section
8 violated the establishment and free exercise clauses of the first
amendment, they met the double nexus test. Flast did not overrule
Frothingham, but it did relax the requirements for taxpayer stand32
ing.
The significance of Hardin v. Kentucky Utilities Co. 3 to the decisional development of nonstatutory standing has become apparent
in view of the Court's later reading of the case. The Court held that
a private utility had standing to enjoin the Tennessee Valley Authority from supplying power to the towns being primarily supplied
by the complainant:
when the particular statutory provision invoked does reflect a legislative purpose to protect a competitive interest, the injured com34
petitor has standing to require compliance with that provision.
Although the case did not so state, the converse has been read into
the decision-that unless a party's interests are protected by a statute, he does not have standing.
Two years later, in Association of Data ProcessingService Organizations, Inc. v. Camp,3 5 the Court created a two-pronged test for
standing to obtain judicial review of administrative action, discarding a large part of the former foundations of standing.3 6 Sellers of
data processing services had sought to challenge a ruling of the
Comptroller of the Currency allowing national banks to provide
data processing services to other banks and bank customers. The
Court rejected the contention that only "legal interests"-e.g. those
arising from contract, property, or statutory rights-are protectible.
Such a determination relates to the merits of the case, quite apart
from the issue of standing. 7 The new test for standing was whether
the plaintiff alleged that the challenged action had caused him
"injury in fact, economic or otherwise, ' 3 and whether his allegations established that the interest he sought to protect arguably fell
31. Id. at 102-03.
32. See generally Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. CHi. L. REV. 601 (1968);
Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-Hohfeldian or IdeologicalPlaintiff,
116 U. PA. L. REV. 1033 (1968).
33. 390 U.S. 1 (1968).
34. Id. at 6.
35. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
36. See generally Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 450 (1970);
Jaffe, Standing Again, 84 H~Av. L. REV. 633 (1971).
37. Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153
(1970).
38. Id. at 152.
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within the zone of interests protected by the relevant statute. 9
The Court applied this new "zone of interests" test in Barlow v.
Collins,40 a companion case to Data Processing, in order to grant
standing to tenant farmers seeking to challenge a regulation issued
by the Secretary of Agriculture permitting assignments of payments
to secure rent for farms. The regulation in effect released the tenant
farmers from previously imposed restrictions. However, the question of whether the particular interest asserted was sufficient to
support the plaintiffs' standing was never reached. Instead, the
Court held that:
First, there is no doubt that in the context of this litigation the
tenant farmers . . . have the personal stake and interest that impart the concrete adverseness required by Article III.
Second, the tenant farmers are clearly within the zone of interests protected by the Act."
Was it the particular interest a plaintiff was asserting, or the
interests of those of a plaintiff's class in general that was to be
within the zone of interests?" Justices Brennan and White, concurring in the result but dissenting from the Court's disposition of
the standing issue, stated that injury in fact was properly the only
test required to determine standing. Anything beyond that was
"wholly unnecessary and inappropriate"43 and "a useless and unnecessary exercise . . . which may well deny justice."44
Later cases reinforced the implication that the general interests
of the class to which the complainants belong determines whether
standing exists in a particular instance.45 In Investment Company
Institute v. Camp46 the Court recognized that Congress had evidenced concern about reduction of competition by regulating competition in the investment banking industry. Without resorting to
the language of Data Processing, the majority granted plaintiffs
39. Id. at 153.
40. 397 U.S. 159 (1970).
41. Id. at 164 (emphasis added).
42. Justices Brennan and White, concurring and dissenting, discuss further the confusion
bred by the Court's "zone of interests" test, 397 U.S. 159, 176-77 (1970).
43. Id. at 169.
44. Id. at 170.
45. The cases discussed are only those decisions which have dealt with the zone of interests aspect of the test for standing. For the decisions which have focused on the injury in fact
aspect, see Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407
U.S. 163 (1972); United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412
U.S. 669 (1973).
46. 401 U.S. 617 (1971).
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standing, since the regulated competition was the basis of the complaint. 7
In Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.,4 the Court
sustained the standing of two tenants to maintain an action under
section 810(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1968. The plaintiffs, residents of an apartment complex whose landlord discriminated
against nonwhites, alleged that they thereby lost both the social
benefits of living in an integrated community and the concomitant
business and professional advantages that would have been gained;
and that they were otherwise stigmatized as residents of a white
ghetto.49
After analyzing the purpose of the Civil Rights Act and the
"broad and inclusive" statutory language, the Court noted that the
dispute was presented in an adversary context so as to avoid any
article III problems. 0 The Court, giving life to section 810(a), held
that the plaintiffs were "persons aggrieved" and had standing to
sue.

5

Roe v. Wade" was an action for declaratory and injunctive relief
from prosecution under the Texas criminal abortion statutes. The
Court upheld the standing of the pregnant unmarried plaintiff, 3
citing the existence of
[t]he "logical nexus between the status asserted and the claim
sought to be adjudicated," Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S., at 102, and
the necessary degree of contentiousness. ....

.1

The Court seemed to signal a retreat from the zone of interests test
to the less rigid nexus test originated in Flast to evaluate taxpayer
standing.
In 1974, in United States v. Richardson,55 the Court clarified its
position. Richardson alleged that the provisions of the Central Intelligence Agency Act concerning public reporting of expenditures were
47. Id. at 620-21.
48. 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
49. Id. at 208.
50. Id. at 209, 211.
51. Id. at 212.
52. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
53. A childless married couple did not have standing because their alleged injury was
based on future possibilities. Id. at 128. A third plaintiff, a licensed physician with two
abortion prosecutions pending against him, was dismissed, since he could assert any federally
protected right in his defense to the criminal charge. Id. at 125-27.
54. Id. at 124. The Court also considered the fact that the case might be moot because
Roe was no longer pregnant. Noting the short human gestation period, the Court stated that
pregnancy was "a classic justification for a conclusion of nonmootness." Id. at 125.
55. 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
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in violation of article I, section 9, clause 7 of the Constitution. 6 In
a 5-4 decision, the Court held that Richardson lacked standing to
sue either as a citizen or as a taxpayer. Chief Justice Burger, writing
for the majority, based this decision on the plaintiff's failure to
demonstrate more than a generalized grievance suffered in common
with all other citizens. Further, his failure to establish a sufficient
nexus between his status as a taxpayer and the alleged failure of
Congress to demand a more detailed report from the CIA militated
against a finding that Richardson had standing. 7
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

In its latest statement on standing the Court rejected application
of any strict formula, be it a nexus or zone of interests approach.
Warth v. Seldin was a suit brought by various organizations and
residents in the Rochester, New York metropolitan area against
members of the zoning, planning, and town boards of Penfield, a
suburb of Rochester. The complaint alleged that the town's zoning
ordinance effectively excluded minority groups by practically eliminating low and moderate income housing "in furtherance of a policy
of exclusionary zoning." 59 This policy allegedly violated petitioners'
first, ninth and fourteenth amendment rights, as well as 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1981, 1982 and 1983.60
The plaintiffs included two nonprofit organizations concerned
with housing shortages and other similar problems, an association
of residential construction firms, several individual Rochester taxpayers, and several minority residents. They alleged, in addition to
violation of their constitutional rights, that they were variously pre56. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl.7:
No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations
made by Law; and a regular statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time.
57. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 172, 175 (1974). Justice Powell stated in
his concurring opinion that, although taxpayer standing existed in establishment clause
cases, i.e. in a Flast fact situation, the Flast double nexus test should be abandoned. Id. at
180. Justices Stewart and Marshall, in dissent, thought the taxpayer approach wrong, since
an affirmative duty to report expenditures existed in this case. Id. at 202-03. Justice Brennan
would have upheld standing on plaintiff's good faith allegations of injury in fact and nothing
more, id. at 235-36; while Justice Douglas would have found standing based on the plaintiff's
status as a taxpayer and especially as a citizen. Id. at 200-02. For a full discussion of the
Court's decision, see Supreme Court Limits Taxpayer Standing, supra note 22.
58. 95 S.Ct. 2197 (1975).
59. Id. at 2203. Plaintiffs alleged that the town's zoning ordinance lot size, set back and
density requirements, land allocation, delaying tactics on proposals, denial of proposals and
refusals to grant necessary variances and permits made low and moderate income housing
economically unfeasible and "virtually impossible." Id.
60. Id. at 2202. The facts are taken from the opinion at 2202-04.
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vented from moving into or living in Penfield, or from building low
and moderate income housing in that suburb. The Rochester taxpayers claimed that Penfield's exclusionary zoning policies forced
the city of Rochester to provide a greater number of such housing
units, resulting in a greater tax burden on its residents.
Rather than mechanically applying a Flast or Data Processing
test, the Court emphasized the dual nature of the standing issue:
the constitutional and the prudential limitations. The threshold
question of whether a plaintiff satisfies the article III "case or controversy" requirement goes to the justiciability or constitutional
dimension of standing:
As an aspect of justiciability, the standing question is whether the
plaintiff has "alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy" to warrant his invocation of federal court jurisdiction
and to justify exercise of the court's remedial powers on his behalf."'
Once the case or controversy requirement is met, the Court still has
the power to decline to hear a case based on certain prudential
limitations. A refusal to hear a claim based solely on a generalized
grievance suffered in common with a large class of citizens62 or one
based on legal rights and interests of third parties is warranted., 3
The Court stated that although "standing in no way depends on
the merits," the source of the claim often is of great significance
with respect to the prudential rules of standing:
Essentially, the standing question in such cases is whether the
constitutional or statutory provision on which the claim rests properly can be understood as granting persons in the plaintiff's position a right to judicial relief. 4
The majority acknowledged that persons may have standing to
seek relief based on a general public interest or on legal rights of
third parties if Congress has provided for a right of action. 5 Nevertheless, the Court held that none of the petitioners had alleged facts
sufficient to demonstrate that it was "a proper party to invoke judicial resolution of the dispute and the exercise of the court's remedial
powers" and so dismissal for lack of standing was affirmed.6 6
61.
62.
United
(1937).
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id. at 2205 (citation omitted).
E.g., Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. To Stop The War, 418 U.S. 208, 220 (1974);
States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 175-77 (1974); Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633, 634
E.g., Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44 (1943).
Warth v. Seldin, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 2206 (1975).

Id.
Id. at 2215.
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Mr. Justice Douglas strongly dissented from the Court's manipulation of standing principles to deny these plaintiffs access to a
forum in which to litigate their grievances. He indicated that the
Court's antagonism toward the substance of the claim, "the very
sensitive matters, some of which involve race, some class distinctions based on wealth," was the basis for the decision. 7
Standing has become a barrier to access to the federal courts, just
as "the political question" was in earlier decades. .

.

.[Clases

such as this one reflect festering sores in our society; and the American dream teaches that if one reaches high enough and persists
there is a forum where justice is dispensed. I would lower the
technical barriers and let the courts serve that ancient need."
ANTITRUST STANDING

We must confess at the outset that we find antitruststanding cases
more than a little confusing and certainly beyond our powers of
69
reconciliation.
Standing problems in private antitrust litigation stem from the
language of section 4 of the Clayton Act. 0 The courts have seized
the phrase "by reason of" to require the private plaintiff to allege a
causal relationship between the purported violation and the injury.
Courts draw a line, dismissing those plaintiffs whose relationship
with the alleged violator (the direct injury approach) or with the
affected area of the economy (the target area approach) is "too
tenuous to support recovery."7
The rationale behind the foregoing demarcation is simple, fair and
reasonable. It respects the purpose of § 4 of the Clayton Act ....
[I]f the flood-gates were opened to permit treble damage suits by
every creditor, stockholder, employee, subcontractor, or supplier of
goods and services that might be affected, the lure of the treble
recovery . . .would result in an over-kill, due to an enlargement

of the private weapon to a caliber far exceeding that contemplated
2
by Congress.

However, congressional concern regarding enlargement of the cali67. Id.
68. Id. The theme was repeated in the dissent of Justice Brennan, joined by Justices
White and Marshall. Id. at 2216.
69. Wilson v. Ringsby Truck Lines, Inc., 320 F. Supp. 699, 701 (D. Colo. 1970).
70. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
71. Beane, Antitrust: Standing and Passing On, 26 BAYLOR L. REV. 331, 333 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Standing and Passing On].
72. Calderone Enterprises Corp. v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., 454 F.2d 1292,
1295 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 930 (1972).
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ber of the weapon which it had created is not readily apparent from
a survey of the history of this treble damage remedy.
Section 4 of the Clayton Act: HistoricalDevelopment
In the latter part of the 19th century, the United States was
rapidly changing from a largely rural, agrarian economy into an
urbanized, industrial one. Unprecedented concentrations of power
accompanied the transformation, increasingly arousing public opinion. Public hatred of monopolies ran deep, and nothing less than a
law capable of destroying the trusts was demanded.73 In 1890, Congress responded by enacting the Sherman Act.74 Congress encouraged private enforcement of the antitrust laws by enacting section
4 of the Clayton Act,75 thereby providing a treble damage remedy
to individual plaintiffs:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by
reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the United States in the district in which
the defendant resides or is found or has an agent, without respect
to the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable
attorney's fee."
The legislative history of the statute supplies no indication that
Congress intended to limit the class of persons to whom its relief
would be available.7 7 The private antitrust action was intended not
only to serve to compensate victims of antitrust violations, but also
to deter business behavior in violation of the Sherman or Clayton
Acts" and thereby vindicate the important public interest in free
73. See generally Letwin, Congress and the Sherman Antitrust Law: 1887-1890, 23 U. Cm.
L. REV. 221 (1956).
74. 26 Stat. 209 et seq. (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970).
75. Section 4 superceded section 7 of the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 210 (1890), which stated
in relevant part:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by any other person or
corporation by reason of anything forbidden or declared to be unlawful by this act,
may sue therefor ... and shall recover three fold the damages by him sustained,
and the costs of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
It is generally agreed that the purpose of the treble damage remedy remained unchanged. 51
CONG. REC. 9164 (1914); H.R. REP. No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1914).

76. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
77. 21 CONG. REC. 2563, 2564 (1890). See generally Comment, Should "Injury" In Treble
Damage Suits Be Redefined?, 51 Nw. U.L. REv. 141 (1956).
78. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139 (1968). For
a discussion of the effectiveness of section 4 actions as deterrent and compensatory forces,
see Wheeler, Antitrust Treble-Damage Actions: Do They Work?, 61 CALIF. L. REv. 1319
(1973).
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competition.79 It was believed that private antitrust litigation would
be "one of the surest weapons" 0 in the scheme for enforcement of
the antitrust laws. The treble damage remedy would stimulate "one
. . .private interest to combat transgressions by another."'" Private
litigants would serve as private attorneys general 2 and thereby supply an "ancillary force of private investigators to supplement the
Department of Justice" 3 in patrolling the antitrust domain."
[Iun effect it enrolls an additional number of policemen who may
be expected to protect their interests assiduously and vigorously
demand relief when they have been injured. This consideration is
of particular consequence as respects the vast number of less serious violations which occur and which may be beyond the effective
reach of government enforcement agencies. 5
The Supreme Court has commented on the scope of section 4,
noting that the remedy is not restricted
to consumers, or to purhcasers, or to competitors, or to sellers. .

.

.The Act is comprehensive in its terms and coverage,

protecting all who are made victims of the forbidden practices by
whomever they may be perpetrated. 8
The Court, however, has only indirectly indicated its position on
the threshold requirements for recovery under section 4: a "person
. . .injured. . . by reason of. . ." an antitrust violation. 7 Citing
79. Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 502 (1969);
Flintkote Co. v. Lysfjord, 246 F.2d 368, 398 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 835 (1957).
Accord, Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 493 (1940).
80. Leh v. General Petroleum Corp., 382 U.S. 54, 59 (1965), reh. denied, 382 U.S. 1001
(1966); Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co., 381 U.S. 311, 318
(1965); Kinnear-Weed Corp. v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 214 F.2d 891, 893 (5th Cir. 1954),
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 912 (1955).
81. Bruce's Juices v. American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743, 751 (1947).
82. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of Calif., 405 U.S. 251, 262 (1972). See, e.g., Zenith Radio
Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 130-31 (1969); Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v.
International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 147 (1968) (Fortas, J., concurring in result); Maltz
v. Sax, 134 F.2d 2, 4 (7th Cir. 1943).
83. Quemos Theatre Co., Inc. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 35 F. Supp. 949, 950 (D.N.J.
1940); Weinberg v. Sinclair Refining Co., 48 F. Supp. 203, 205 (E.D.N.Y. 1942).
84. Nashville Milk Co. v. Carnation Co., 355 U.S. 373, 386 (1958) (Douglas, J., dissenting). See, e.g., Lawlor v. National Screen Serv. Corp., 349 U.S. 322, 329 (1955); Trebuhs
Realty Co. v. News Syndicate Co., 107 F. Supp. 595, 599 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); Fanchon & Marco
v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 84, 88 (S.D. Calif. 1951), aft'd, 215 F.2d 167 (9th
Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 912 (1955).
85. Barber, Private Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws: The Robinson-Patman
Experience, 30 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 181, 183 (1961).
86. Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 236
(1948).
87. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970). For an in-depth analysis of each of the elements of a section 4
cause of action, see Note, Standing to Sue For Treble Damages Under Section 4 of the
Clayton Act, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 570 (1964).
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congressional enactments protecting "victims of the forbidden practices as well as the public""8 and other policies favoring private
antitrust litigants, the Court stated:
In the face of such a policy this Court should not add requirements
to burden the private litigant beyond what is specifically set forth
by Congress in those laws."
In Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co.,10 the
Court held there was no need to allege injury to the general public
in addition to injury to the particular plaintiff:
Congress having thus prescribed the criteria of the prohibitions,
the courts may not expand them. Therefore, to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted under that section, allegations adequate to show a violation and, in a private treble damage action,
that plaintiff was damaged thereby are all the law requires."
But beyond such generalized statements, the Supreme Court has
never directly dealt with this problem of standing to sue under
section 4 of the Clayton Act.
Although neither the equivocal legislative history 2 nor the inconclusive Supreme Court decisions suggest limitations on the availability of treble damage recoveries, the lower federal courts, in interpreting the language of the statute have construed "by reason of"
to create a standing requirement:
Standing to sue was not given by Congress to any and every citizen
who, motivated by public spirit or possibly some baser reason,
would set himself up as a watchdog of business behavior. Congress
properly bestowed the right to sue only on such persons as might
be injured in their business or property by reason of anything for3
bidden in the antitrust laws.
Courts have always had the power to define the scope and effect
of an injury by means of such notions as proximate cause, foreseeability, duty and the sine qua non principles of tort law.9 4 They have
further justified denying a plaintiff standing, limiting liability
traceable to a defendant for policy reasons. 5 The Supreme Court
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 454 (1957).
Id.
364 U.S. 656 (1961).
Id. at 660.
Pollock, Standing to Sue, Remoteness of Injury, and the Passing-On Doctrine, 32

A.B.A. ANTTRusT L.J. 5, 8-9 (1966).

93. SCM Corp. v. Radio Corp. of America, 407 F.2d 166, 171 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 395
U.S. 943 (1969).
94. Antitrust law has its roots in tort law. See generally Pollock, The "Injury" and "Causation" Elements Of a Treble Damage Antitrust Action, 57 Nw. U.L. REV. 691 (1963).
95. Among the reasons articulated by the courts are: the drastic nature of the treble
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recognized the existence of such judicial construction of the causation language of section 4 in Hawaii v. Standard Oil Company of
California," noting that:
The lower courts have been virtually unanimous in concluding that
Congress did not intend the antitrust laws to provide a remedy in
damages for all injuries that might conceivably be traced to an
antitrust violation."
This use of a causation requirement to screen section 4 plaintiffs
has evolved into two main camps: that which adheres to a direct
injury approach, and that which follows a target area approach.
The Direct Injury Approach
Early cases involving treble damage actions adopted a restrictive
view of which plaintiffs were entitled to maintain suit. Loeb v.
Eastman Kodak Co.,"5 involved a shareholder and creditor of a corporation allegedly driven into bankruptcy by the defendant's antitrust violations. The court, finding the plaintiff failed to state a
cause of action, noted the traditional rule was that the sole redress
for injuries such as those alleged by the plaintiff was an action by
the corporate entity. The Sherman Act did not authorize hundreds
or thousands of stockholders individually to maintain suits. 9 Additionally, the court held that the plaintiff did not have a right of
action since he
did not receive any direct injury from the alleged illegal acts of the
defendant. No conspiracy or combination against him as a stockholder or creditor is alleged. The injury complained of was directed
at the corporation, and not the individual stockholder. Hence, any
injury which he, as a stockholder, received was indirect, remote,
and consequential.9 0
Following the lead of Loeb, other courts have held that plaintiffs
asserting secondary or "derivative" losses lacked standing to sue.
These progeny often have categorically denied recovery to those
damage remedy, Image & Sound Serv. Corp. v. Altec Serv. Corp., 148 F. Supp. 237, 239 (D.
Mass. 1956); unfairness of permitting windfall recovery to plaintiff harmed incidentally,
Snow Crest Beverages, Inc. v. Recipe Foods, Inc., 147 F. Supp. 907, 909 (D. Mass. 1956);
danger of a flood of litigation, Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F. 704, 709 (3d Cir. 1910);
possibility of multiple liability for a single injury, Ames v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 166 F.
820, 823 (D. Mass. 1909); possibility of unfair burden on a particular industry, Harrison v.
Paramount Pictures, Inc., 115 F. Supp. 312, 317 (E.D. Pa. 1953), aff'd, 211 F.2d 405 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 828 (1954).
96. 405 U.S. 251 (1972).
97. Id. at 263 n.14.
98. 183 F. 704 (3d Cir. 1910).
99. Id. at 709.
100. Id.
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separated from the alleged antitrust violator by an intermediary
who was the object of the violation.101
Judge Wyzanski, in Snow Crest Beverages, Inc. v. Recipe Foods,
Inc., 102 articulated the rationale underlying the direct injury test.
It is well settled that despite its broad language § 4 of the Clayton
Act does not give a private cause of action to a person whose losses
result only from an interruption or diminution of profitable relationships with the party directly affected by the alleged violations
of the anti-trust laws. .

.

. [I1f [these decisions] had gone the

other way, there would as a result of the treble damage provisions
of the anti-trust acts have been given in each case

. . .

what has

sometimes been called a "windfall". In effect, businessmen would
be subjected to liabilities of indefinable
scope for conduct already
13
subject to drastic private remedies.
The crux of the direct injury test is an analysis of the relationship
between the plaintiff and the alleged violator: the "victim" must
have some direct business contact with the violator' 4 or must be the
101. E.g., Bookout v. Schine Chain Theatres, Inc., 253 F.2d 292 (2d Cir. 1958); Martens
v. Barrett, 245 F.2d 844 (5th Cir. 1957); Peter v. Western Newspaper Union, 200 F.2d 867
(5th Cir. 1953); Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F. 704 (3d Cir. 1910); Ames v. American
Tel. & Tel. Co., 166 F. 820 (D. Mass. 1909); Skouras Theatres Corp. v. Radio-Keith-Orpheum
Corp., 193 F. Supp. 401 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); Westmoreland Asbestos Co. v. Johns-Manville
Corp., 30 F. Supp. 389 (S.D.N.Y. 1939), aff'd, 113 F.2d 114 (2d Cir. 1940) (stockholders);
Martens v. Barrett, 245 F.2d 844 (5th Cir. 1957); Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F. 704
(3d Cir. 1910) (creditors);
Deaktor v. Fox Grocery Co., 332 F. Supp. 536 (W.D. Pa. 1971); Centanni v. T. Smith &
Son, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 330 (E.D. La.), aff'd, 323 F.2d 363 (5th Cir. 1963); Miley v. John
Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 148 F. Supp. 299 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 242 F.2d 758 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 828 (1957); Sargent v. National Broadcasting Co., 136 F. Supp. 560 (N.D.
Cal. 1955) (employees and officers);
Billy Baxter, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 431 F.2d 183 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 923
(1971); Nationwide Auto Appraiser Serv. v. Association of Cas. & Sur. Co., 382 F.2d 925 (10th
Cir. 1967) (franchisors);
SCM Corp. v. Radio Corp. of America, 407 F.2d 166 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 943,
reh. denied, 396 U.S. 869 (1969); Productive Inventions, Inc. v. Trico Products Corp., 224 F.2d
678 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 936 (1956) (licensors or patent owners);
Melrose Realty Co. v. Loew's, Inc., 234 F.2d 518 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 890 (1956),
reh. denied, 355 U.S. 900 (1957); Lieberthal v. North Country Lanes, Inc., 221 F. Supp. 685
(S.D.N.Y. 1963); Harrison v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 115 F. Supp. 312 (E.D. Pa. 1953),
aft'd, 211 F.2d 405 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 828 (1954) (landlords);
Volasco Products Co. v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 308 F.2d 383 (6th Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
372 U.S. 907 (1963); Snow Crest Beverages, Inc. v. Recipe Foods, Inc., 147 F. Supp. 907 (D.
Mass. 1956) (suppliers);
Coast v. Hunt Oil Co., 195 F.2d 870 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 836 (1952); Schwartz
v. Broadcast Music, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 322 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); (members of a partnership or
association).
102. 147 F. Supp. 907 (D. Mass. 1956).
103. Id. at 909.
104. See, e.g., Denver Petroleum Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 306 F. Supp. 289, 306, 309 (D.
Colo. 1969).
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one against whom the conspiracy is directed. 1"5 If the necessary direct connection between the antitrust violation and the injury is
demonstrated, the plaintiff will be permitted to maintain his suit.
However, the use of such terms as "indirect," "remote," "incidental" or "consequential" has camouflaged the direct injury test by
masking the real factors considered in denying standing.' 6 This
circumlocution has led to inconsistent results. 0 7
The Target Area Approach
It became apparent that strict adherence to the direct injury test
would produce undesirable results, inconsistent with the purpose
of the treble damage action; the approach was not flexible enough
to allow courts to grant standing to those deserving recovery.0 8 As
a result, courts developed the concept of a "target area." This construction of "by reason of" focuses on the relationship between the
injury and the purpose and effect of the alleged violation.
The target area approach also had its origin in the language of
Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co.1°0 The Loeb rationale that no conspiracy or combination was directed against the plaintiff"0 was exby the court in Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew's,
panded
" 111
Inc..

A conspiracy may have many purposes and objects; the conspirators may perform an almost infinite variety of acts in furtherance
of the conspiracy; but, in order to state a cause of action under the
anti-trust laws a plaintiff must show . . . that he is within that
area of the economy which is endangered by a breakdown of competitive conditions in a particular industry. Otherwise he is not
injured "by reason" of anything forbidden in the anti-trust laws."
This relaxation of the standing requirements seemed to be short105. SCM Corp. v. Radio Corp. of America, 407 F.2d 166, 170 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 395
U.S. 943 (1969).
106. See note 95 supra.
107. Compare, e.g., Harrison v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 115 F. Supp. 312 (E.D. Pa.
1953), aft'd, 211 F.2d 405 (3d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 828 (1954), and Melrose Realty
Co. v. Loew's, Inc., 234 F.2d 518 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 890 (1956)(holding injury
to landlord of motion picture theatre entitled to rental based on a percentage of receipts too
remote to permit suit for an alleged conspiracy affecting the movies run at his theatre) with
Congress Building Corp. v. Loew's, Inc., 246 F.2d 587 (7th Cir. 1957) (reaching opposite
results on almost identical facts).
108. Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 265-66, reh. denied, 327 U.S. 817
(1946), quoting Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 565
(1931).
109. 183 F. 704 (1910).
110. Id. at 709.
111. 193 F.2d 51 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 919 (1952).
112. Id. at 54-55 (emphasis added).
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lived when the Ninth Circuit apparently reverted to direct injury
jargon. Karseal v. Richfield Oil Corp.,"' involved exclusive dealing
contracts between Richfield and its service station operators which
prohibited Karseal from distributing its car wax to those dealers.
The court, reversing a dismissal for failure to state a cause of action,
phrased the issue:
[W]as Karseal within the "target area" of Richfield's illegal practices . . . . Assuming Karseal was "hit" by the effect of the Richfield antitrust violations, was Karseal "aimed at" with enough
precision to entitle it to maintain a treble damage suit under the
Clayton Act?"'
Although couching its decision in target area terminology, the use
of "aimed at" and "hit" seemed to emphasize the victim, rather
than the area of the economy, as the target of the violation. The
Ninth Circuit clarified its position in Twentieth Century Fox Film
Corp. v. Goldwyn:"5
But in using the words "aimed at" this court did not mean to imply
that it must have been a purpose of the conspirators to injure the
particular individual claiming damages. Rather, it was intended to
express the view that the plaintiff must show that, whether or not
then known to the conspirators, plaintiff's affected operation was
actually in the area which it could reasonably be foreseen would
be affected by the conspiracy." 6
By adding the concept of foreseeability, the Ninth Circuit expanded
the class of plaintiffs entitled to bring a section 4 action. Standing
is determined without regard to any direct contractual relationship
between the parties.
However, adoption of a more flexible test has not put an end to
the inconsistencies evident under the direct injury test,"7 nor has it
provided any guidance for determining which segment of the economy the court will decide was the target of the combination or
conspiracy." ' The courts often fall into the semantical trap of alter113. 221 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1955).
114. Id. at 362. See Sanitary Milk Producers v. Bergjans Farm Dairy, Inc., 368 F.2d 679,
688-89 (8th Cir. 1966). But cf. Volasco Products Co. v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 308 F.2d
383, 394-95 (6th Cir. 1962).
115. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Goldwyn, 328 F.2d 190 (9th Cir. 1964).
116. Id. at 220.
117. Compare Mulvey v. Samuel Goldwyn Productions, 433 F.2d 1073 (9th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 402 U.S. 923 (1971), with Fields Productions, Inc. v. United Artists Corp., 318
F. Supp. 87 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd, 432 F.2d 1010 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 949
(1971).
118. See, e.g., Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes Nat'l. Training School, 367 F. Supp. 536
(D.D.C. 1973).
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nately referring to a plaintiff as one within the "target area" and
one who is the "target" of the alleged illegal activity, i.e. the one
against whom it is directed." 9 Whether this error is conceptual or
syntactical only adds to the confusion.
Variations On A Theme: New InterpretationsOf Old Tests
The development of distinct approaches to antitrust standing has
led to conflicting results 20 and division among the circuits., Consequently, the courts have reworked the approaches, often merely
fashioning new wrinkles in old analyses. In Billy Baxter, Inc. v.
Coca-Cola Co., 2 the plaintiff was a franchisor who sold beverage
extracts and recipes, in addition to advertising and promotional
services, to carbonated beverage bottlers. The complaint alleged
that the defendants 3 had violated the antitrust laws by excluding
plaintiff from normal channels of distribution. 4 Noting the policy
reasons behind limiting access to the courts by potential antitrust
plaintiffs, the court referred to the direct injury and target area
tests:
These terms do not provide talismanic guides to decision, but they
do indicate the need to examine the form of violation alleged and
the nature of its effect on a plaintiffs own business activities.'25
The court reasoned that the target area of the defendant's alleged
violations was the marketing of bottled beverages, and that since
plaintiff was not in the business of marketing, manufacturing or
distributing bottled beverages, but merely licensed the information,
he was outside the economic target area of the offense.' 2 The court
emphasized the need to show a causal connection between the violation and the injury-some proof that the alleged misconduct was a
"material cause" or "substantial factor" of the injury.'1 The Second
Circuit apparently compromised both prevalent formulas by broadening the direct injury approach and narrowing the target area test.
119. See, e.g., Calderone Enterprises Corp. v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., 454
F.2d 1292 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 930 (1972).
120. See notes 107 and 117 supra.
121. For a discussion of the target area and direct injury tests applied by the various
circuits, see Comment, Standing Under Clayton § 4: A ProverbialMystery, 77 DICKINSON L.
REV. 73, 85 (1972); Standing and Passing On, supra note 71 at 352.
122. 431 F.2d 183 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 923, reh. denied, 401 U.S. 1014
(1971).
123. The action was also commenced against Canada Dry Corporation. Id. at 185.
124. Id. at 185-86.
125. Id. at 187. Accord, Ragar v. T.J. Raney & Sons, 1975-1 Trade Cas. 60,344, 66,430
(E.D. Ark. 1975).
126. Billy Baxter, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 431 F.2d 183, 188 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
401 U.S. 923, reh. denied, 401 U.S. 1014 (1971).
127. Id. at 187.
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In CalderoneEnterprises Corp. v. United Artists Theatre Circuit,
Inc., 28 the court compounded the confusion by stating that "it is
necessary to use a rule of reason in construing the requirements of
section 4 of the Clayton Act as to standing .... ""I South Carolina
Council of Milk Producers,Inc. v. Newton'30 introduced the principle of proximate causation to the target area test.
If a plaintiff can show himself within the sector of the economy
in which the violation threatened a breakdown of competitive conditions and that he was proximately injured thereby, then he has
standing to sue under § 4.13l

In Johnson v. Ready Mix Concrete Co.,' 3 2 the court stated that the
policy of limiting section 4 standing to those "directly injured by the
alleged violation" was known as the "target area" doctrine; discussed the "aimed at" language of Karseal;'1 added the proximate
cause concept of South Carolina Council of Milk Producers,Inc. v.
Newton, ' and the foreseeability notion of Hoopes v. Union Oil
Co.' 5 and found that the plaintiff did have standing.'3 6 The court
in Kirihara v. Bendix Corp.'37 variegated the target area theme by
injecting a discussion of the relevant market:
In order to have a § 4 cause of action . . .not alone must the

claimed injury be directly and proximately caused by the proscribed acquisition, but also the injured must be one of the components of the competitive infra-structure of the relevant market
involved in the complaint

. .

.

and the effect of such injury upon

that component must validate the reasonable probability that a
substantial anti-competitive effect upon the viability of competition in that market will flow from the condemned acquisition. 36
Courts have expressed their acceptance of both tests' 9 and have
evidenced an inability to tell the difference. 4 ' The court in Wilson
128. 454 F.2d 1292 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 930 (1972).
129. Id. at 1296. The rule of reason is a test for determining liability on the merits in
antitrust cases. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). The
advisability of applying a test on the merits of a question in determining antitrust standing
has been seriously questioned. See text accompanying notes 154 through 157 infra.
130. 360 F.2d 414 (4th Cir. 1966).
131. Id. at 418. Accord, Dailey v. Quality School Plan, Inc., 380 F.2d 484, 487-88 (5th Cir.
1967).
132. 318 F. Supp. 930 (D. Neb. 1970).
133. 221 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1955).
134. 360 F.2d 414 (4th Cir. 1966).
135. 374 F.2d 480 (9th Cir. 1967).
136. Johnson v. Ready Mix Concrete Co., 318 F. Supp. 930, 932-33 (D. Neb. 1970).
137. 306 F. Supp. 72 (D. Hawaii 1969).
138. Id. at 90.
139. H. F. & S. Co. v. American Standard, Inc., 336 F. Supp. 110, 115-17 (D. Kan. 1972).
140. Nationwide Auto Appraiser Serv., Inc. v. Association of Cas. & Sur. Cos., 382 F.2d
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v. Ringsby Truck Lines, Inc."' expressed doubt that either the direct injury or target area test was the correct interpretation of section 4 of the Clayton Act.' In the midst of all this confusion, it was
not surprising that the Malamud court felt constrained to find another solution, ingenious or outrageous as the result may have been.
Certainly the problem of antitrust standing demanded a fresh approach.
ANTITRUST STANDING:

A NEW

DIRECTION?

The Malamud court's resort to the Data Processing zone of interests test was foreshadowed by the attempts of a number of courts
to deal with the problem of antitrust standing in terms other than
target area or direct injury. The courts have sometimes enunciated
a test which sounds surprisingly similar to the zone of interests test.
In Billy Baxter, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co.,' 43 the court stated:
[T]his connection must also link a specific form of illegal act to
a plaintiff engaged in the sort of legitimate activities which the
prohibition of this type of violation was clearly intended to
protect.'"
In noting that section 4 of the Clayton Act contains no limitations
upon standing either in terms of a "direct injury" or "target area"
restriction, the court in Wilson v. Ringsby Truck Lines, Inc.,
stated:
It may also be argued that the purpose and language of this legislation are so sweeping that any person injured by the proscribed
conduct should be considered within the class which Congress intended to protect.146
The court in Reibert v. Atlantic Richfield Co. " expressed the test
in terms of proximate cause: a causal connection must exist between
the plaintiff's injury and the antitrust violation which was a substantial factor in the infliction of injury; and the alleged violation
had to be linked to "a plaintiff engaged in activities intended to be
protected by the antitrust laws."'' 4 The plaintiff, a former employee
of Sinclair Oil Corporation, was discharged due to the duplication
of jobs resulting from the merger of Sinclair and Atlantic Richfield.
925, 928
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

(10th Cir. 1967).
320 F. Supp. 699 (D. Colo. 1970).
Id. at 702.
431 F.2d 183 (2d Cir. 1970).
Id. at 187 (emphasis added).
320 F. Supp. 699 (D. Colo. 1970).
Id. at 702-03 (emphasis added).
471 F.2d 727 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 938 (1973).
Id. at 731.
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Reibert was denied standing since he was "not within the area of
competitive economy protected against unlawful mergers."' 4 In In
re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution M.D.L. No. 31,150 the target
area approach was praised for providing:
a logical and flexible tool for analyzing whether a particular claimant falls within the class of persons slated by Congress for protection under section 4 of the Clayton Act. 5'
Malamud v. Sinclair Oil Corp.: The Sixth Circuit's Answer
The court in Malamud v. Sinclair Oil Corp.,52 in announcing a
new direction in antitrust standing, abandoned the script of previous cases and followed the lead of Warth v. Seldin 53 in discussing
standing as an aspect of justiciability. The court perceived section
four's requirement that any person must have suffered injury in fact
before bringing suit as satisfying the article III criteria.'54 The target
area and direct injury tests add a burden to plaintiffs at the pleading stage unwarranted by the concept of justiciability. Both enabled
a court "to make a determination on the merits of a claim under the
guise of assessing the standing of the claimant."'55 While in agreement with the theory that not every person injured is entitled to
bring suit under section 4, the court was also aware of the Supreme
Court's admonition in Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System,
Inc., ' 8 that summary procedures should be used sparingly in complex antitrust litigation where motive and intent play leading
roles.'57
In applying the Data Processing test, the Sixth Circuit acknowledged that the test was developed to deal with suits challenging
actions by admimistrative agencies, but pointed out that a private
antitrust action was in the nature of a public suit, since the plaintiff
sought both to remedy the alleged injury to himself and to "vindicate the important public interest in free competition."' 58
Although it might be disputed that Data Processing can be applied to a non-administrative agency action, such as antitrust litigation, the zone of interests test has been applied by lower federal
149. Id. at 732.
150. 481 F.2d 122 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1045 (1973).
151. Id. at 128.
152. 521 F.2d 1142 (6th Cir. 1975).
153. 95 S.Ct. 2197 (1975).
154. Malamud v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 521 F.2d 1142, 1149 (6th Cir. 1975).
155. Id. at 1150.
156. 368 U.S. 464 (1962).
157. Malamud v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 521 F.2d 1142, 1150 (6th Cir. 1975), quoting Poller
v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962).
158. Id.at 1151.
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courts to non-administrative government action'59 and to nongovernmental action, 60 as well as to cases involving judicial review of
administrative action.' Two cases seemed to indicate that the zone
of interests test was an alternative construction of the nexus test.' 2
In neither case did the court justify or rationalize its application of
the nexus test to a non-taxpayer suit.
The plaintiffs satisfied the first prong of the test by alleging injury
in fact. The investment companies asserted that Sinclair's failure
to provide necessary financing effectively prevented them from expanding their operations. This allegation clearly convinced the
court that the first element of the test had been satisfied.'13 As to
the second prong, the interest sought to be protected by the real
estate firms was the expansion of their business. The antitrust laws
were enacted to protect individuals and the public from the effects
of combinations and conspiracies in restraint of trade.' 4 Sinclair
had refused to provide promised financial assistance and had refused to release the plaintiffs from their distribution agreement.
[Tihis denial of financing arguably comes within the zone of interests protected by the Sherman and Clayton Acts. Regardless of
what the proof at trial may show, the investment companies have
made sufficient allegations
to establish their standing to sue under
65
the antitrust laws.'
CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court has on occasion granted standing to plaintiffs
it considered deserving of the opportunity to bring suit because of
expressed congressional intent or because of the laudatory purpose
of the statute upon which the claim rested. Such an occasion, which
could be paralleled to the antitrust situation, existed in Trafficante
v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.' 6 The statutory definition of a
159. See, e.g., Springfield Television, Inc. v. Springfield, 462 F.2d 21 (8th Cir. 1972);
Inglewood v. Los Angeles, 451 F.2d'948 (9th Cir. 1971); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 450
F.2d 199 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 922 (1972); In re Calandra, 332 F. Supp. 737
(N.D. Ohio 1971), aft'd, 465 F.2d 1218 (6th Cir. 1972).
160. See, e.g., National Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Independent Postal Sys. of America,
Inc., 470 F.2d 265 (10th Cir. 1972); Colligan v. Activities Club, Ltd., 442 F.2d 686 (2d Cir.
1971); Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1970); Grier v. Specialized Skills, Inc., 326
F. Supp. 856 (W.D.N.C. 1971); Davis v. Hunter, 323 F. Supp. 976 (D. Conn. 1970).
161. For a full discussion of lower federal court decisions in the wake of Data Processing,
see Hasl, Standing Revisited - The Aftermath of Data Processing, 18 ST. Louis U.L.J. 12,
22-39 (1973).
162. Council No. 34 v. Ogilvie, 465 F.2d 221 (7th Cir. 1972); Lee v. Nyquist, 318 F. Supp.
710 (W.D.N.Y. 1970), afj'd, 402 U.S. 935 (1971).
163. Malamud v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 521 F.2d 1142, 1151 (6th Cir. 1975).
164. Id. at 1151-52.
165. Id. at 1152.
166. 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
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"person aggrieved" was "[a]ny person who claims to have been
injured by a discriminatory housing practice;' 67 the section 4 any
person "injured . . . by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws"'6 8 is similarly broad and inclusive. " Also, in neither case
is the legislative history helpful. Additionally, the Court noted that:
[Tihe complainants act not only on their own behalf, but also "as
private attorneys general in vindicating170a policy that Congress
considered to be of the highest priority.'
The Court might just as well have been speaking of the section 4
plaintiff, who enforces the antitrust laws "to preserve competition
and to protect the consumer.''
The Court concluded:
We can give vitality to § 810(a) only by a generous construction
which gives standing to sue to all in the same housing unit who are
injured by racial discrimination in the management
of those facili72
ties within the coverage of the statute.'
The Court could likewise conclude that to give vitality to section 4
of the Clayton Act, an expansive interpretation granting standing
to sue to all who could show injury to an interest sought to be
protected by the antitrust laws was in order.
In its latest statement on standing, Warth v. Seldin,173 the Court
indicated a willingness to adhere to a zone of interests type test. The
injury alleged often exists by virtue of a statute which creates the
legal right violated, and thereby satisfies the article III case or controversy requirement; standing becomes a question of preclusion by
prudential limitations. The issue is then:
Whether the constitutional or statutory provision on which the
claim rests properly can be understood as granting
persons in the
7
plaintiffs position a right to judicial relief. '
The Malamud court saw section 4 as a broad statutory grant of
standing to be accorded in light of other statutory provisions."'
Since the plaintiffs alleged violations of section 1 of the Sherman
167. Id. at 208, quoting the language of section 810(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1968,
42 U.S.C. § 3610(a) (1970).
168. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
169. Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209 (1972).
170. Id. at 211 (citations omitted).
171. Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew's, Inc., 193 F.2d 51, 55 (9th Cir. 1951). See
Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil Corp., 221 F.2d 358, 365 (9th Cir. 1955).
172. Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 212 (1972).
173. 95 S.Ct. 2197 (1975). See text accompanying notes 72 through 77 supra.
174. Id. at 2206.
175. Malamud v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 521 F.2d 1142, 1151 (6th Cir. 1975).
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Act and section 3 of the Clayton Act their interests had to fall within
the zone of either or both of those statutes. The court treated the
first prong of the test, injury in fact, rather summarily, apparently
equating injury in fact with any injury to business or property traceable to an antitrust violation. However, once injury in fact has been
admitted, it becomes difficult to say that any of the usual antitrust
plaintiffs is outside the zone of the antitrust laws. Adoption of the
Data Processingtest would signal an abandonment of the variety of
antitrust prudential limitations previously imposed by the courts to
prevent a flood of treble damage litigation.' But whether this is to
be dreaded or welcomed hinges on what is perceived as the function
of imposing a standing requirement in antitrust litigation.
The wording of section 4 itself is broad and expansive; the legislative history does not mandate any limitations on interpretation, and
the Supreme Court has indicated that the section should not be
narrowly construed. If the question of standing is in reality a
"threshold" question in the sense of being an analysis determinative
of the justiciability of a claim and the propriety of invoking the
jurisdiction of a federal court, then perhaps the use of Data
Processing's two prongs does not really create a problem. It would
preclude a preliminary determination of the merits of a plaintiff's
case under the guise of resolving the question of standing. The fact
that the defendant's alleged misconduct may not have been the
legal cause of the plaintiff's injury should not be the deciding factor
in the issue of standing. If the presence or absence of legal interest
is the real issue, then the courts should label it as such.
If section 4 was meant to grant a private remedy to parties
harmed by antitrust violations, then a relaxation of the threshold
requirements is unwarranted. But if section 4 was intended to secure
more effective and extensive enforcement of the antitrust laws by
"deputizing" private litigants, then expansion of the class of persons entitled to bring suit is desirable. Depending upon one's point
of view, Malamud represents either an enlightened approach to the
puzzle of antitrust standing or an aberration of all case law previously written.
CATHY
176.

See note 95 supra.
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